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“Darkside Discretion” refers to a situation where the noncitizen satisfies the statutory criteria set 
by Congress to be eligible for remedy but is denied by an adjudicator in the exercise of discretion. 
Imagine a woman who arrived in the United States six months ago who meets her burden of 
proving she is a refugee based on a fear of persecution by the government in her home country 
because of her religious beliefs, but who is denied asylum for discretionary reasons. This kind of 
decision exposes the “darkside” of discretion because it reflects how the government uses the tool 
of discretion negatively toward the asylum seeker.  Like with asylum, Congress has crafted a range 
of remedies with hefty, medium, and broad statutory criteria as well as a discretionary component. 
Some of the remedies examined in this article include asylum, “adjustment of status,” “extreme 
hardship” waivers, and waiver under the “travel” ban. This article is the first to examine a cross 
section of discretionary decisions across federal agencies under a single normative framework.   
 
This article argues that discretion in immigration cases should center on humanitarian concerns 
and be informed by compassion. How discretion is used matters, and functions best when exercised 
favorably toward the noncitizen. Further, in cases where Congress has already listed statutory 
requirements for immigration benefits or relief, it is generally unsuitable for agencies to issue a 
discretionary denial. This article is the first to consider broad solutions for responding to Darkside 
Discretion. One solution is to eliminate the discretionary component in statutory remedies that 
already include statutory requirements. A second solution is for Congress to create a rebuttable 
presumption in favor of noncitizens. A final but less optimal solution is for agencies to adopt a 
clearer standard for discretion. This article shows how eliminating or transforming the 
discretionary standard in immigration cases will lead to the reduction of arbitrary decisionmaking 
by federal agencies, adherence to administrative law values and greater opportunity for federal 
court review when cases are denied. 
 
 
 Samuel Weiss Faculty Scholar and Clinical Professor of Law, Penn State Law in University Park; I am grateful for 
feedback from faculty at Penn State Law “Brown Bag” (May 2019), DePaul University Law School’s Faculty 
Colloquium (April 2019), New York University School of Law’s Clinical Writers’ Workshop (September 2019), 
Syracuse University College of Law (March 2020), and University of Houston Law Center (March 2020). I benefited 
greatly from individual feedback by Jud Mathews, and Katrice Bridges Copeland. I thank Kaitlyn Box (’20) and Sara 
Riordan (’20) for their research assistance.  
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Prosecutorial discretion refers to the choice made by the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) about the scope of immigration enforcement against a person or group of persons. When 
DHS abstains from taking enforcement action against a person who is otherwise eligible for 
deportation, prosecutorial discretion is exercised favorably. The need for this discretion is 
inevitable because of limited resources and the humanitarian factors that drive DHS protect people 
from deportation.1 Prosecutorial discretion represents one way the federal government makes 
immigration enforcement decisions.    
  
Beyond prosecutorial discretion is the discretion used by executive branch agencies to 
sustain, change, or terminate existing immigration policies within their domain. Discretion also 
lies in the decisions by agencies like DHS, Department of Justice (DOJ), and Department of State 
(DOS). This article examines the use of discretion by federal agencies and serves as a natural 
extension of previous work on prosecutorial discretion, and the existing literature.2 This article 
examines several remedies that involve Darkside Discretion in immigration cases. “Darkside 
Discretion” refers to a situation where the noncitizen satisfies the statutory criteria set by Congress 
to be eligible for a remedy, but is denied by an adjudicator in the exercise of discretion.3 This 
article questions whether this discretionary component is necessary, and highlights the historical 
problems associated with Darkside Discretion. This article proposes that Congress eliminate 
discretion or in the alternative, create a rebuttable presumption in favor of noncitizens in cases 
where they have met the statutory criteria.   
 
 
1 Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 397, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499, 183 L. Ed. 2d 351 (2012). 
 
2 Id. See also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration Enforcement and the Future of Discretion, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS 
UNIV. L. REV. 2 (2018); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Beyond Deportation: Understanding Immigration Prosecutorial 
Discretion and United States v. Texas, 36 IMMIGR. & NAT'LITY L. REV. 94 (2015); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, 
Demystifying Work Authorization and Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Cases, 6 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 
(2016). 
 
3 See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration 
Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 752 (1997) (“This form of discretion, which is prescribed expressly by statute and which 
appears as the end point of a complex, multilayered 'administrative decision’, could be termed delegated discretion.”); 
See also Kate M. Manuel and Michael John Garcia, Executive Discretion as to Immigration: Legal Overview, CONG. 
RES. SERV. (Nov. 10, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43782.pdf. (“In several instances, the INA expressly 
grants immigration officials some degree of discretion over aliens’ eligibility for particular immigration benefits or 
relief, including adjustment to legal immigration status or authorization to work in the United States. These statutory 
delegations sometimes provide immigration officials with broad discretion to determine whether and when aliens may 
be eligible for particular immigration benefits. In other instances, such delegations may permit immigration officials 
to waive the application of a statutory requirement that would bar otherwise-qualifying aliens from obtaining particular 
immigration benefits or relief.”) 
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Maurice Roberts provided some of the earliest thinking on the role of discretion in 
immigration adjudications, and to the field as a scholar, former chairman of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals and later Editor in Chief of Interpreter Releases, a widely circulated weekly 
periodical on immigration.4 He cautioned more than forty years ago “The importance of achieving 
a reasonably sound exercise of discretion at the administrative level is underscored by the fact that, 
in a realistic sense, there is no other place to turn.”5 
 
The field of immigration scholars has since swelled and so too has the literature. Scholars 
have examined the role of discretion in administrative law,6 immigration prosecutorial discretion,7 
and in specific sections of the immigration statute.8 Similarly, scholars have written about 
legislative immigration reform in connection with expanding or shrinking family based 
immigration, increasing the number of employment-based visas, modifying the rules for foreign 
students, and finding solutions for long term residents living in the United States without papers 
or with a temporary status, and those coming in the future.9 While the use of discretion in the 
immigration space has long been driven by humanitarian factors, macro and micro policy changes 
 
4 Maurice A. Roberts, The Exercise of Administrative Discretion Under the Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV., 
144, 144–48 (1975). 
 
5 Id. at 148.  
 
6 See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487 (1983); David Epstein and 
Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POLITICAL SCIENCE 
697 (1994); Linda R. Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 82 NW. U. 
L. REV. 646 (1988). 
 
7 See e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration Enforcement and the Future of Discretion, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS 
UNIV. L. REV. 2 (2018); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Beyond Deportation: Understanding Immigration Prosecutorial 
Discretion and United States v. Texas, 36 IMMIGR. & NAT'LITY L. REV. 94 (2015); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, 
Demystifying Work Authorization and Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Cases, 6 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 
(2016). 
 
8 See, e.g., Maurice A. Roberts, Relief from Deportation: Discretion and Waivers, 1 IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 29 
(1978); Abraham D. Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1293, 1301 (1972); Charles C. Foster, Logic of Adjustment of Status to Permanent Residency, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 
37 (1983). 
 
9 See, e.g., David B. Thronson, You Can't Get Here from Here: Toward a More Child Centered Immigration Law, 14 
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 58 (2006); Michael J. Wishnie, Labor Law After Legalization, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1446 (2008); 
Mariela Olivares, Renewing the Dream: DREAM Act Redux and Immigration Reform, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 79 
(2013); Kevin R. Johnson, Ten Guiding Principles for Truly Comprehensive Immigration Reform: A Blueprint, 55 
WAYNE L. REV. 1599 (2009); Michael A. Olivas, The Political Economy of the Dream Act and the Legislative 
Process: A Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1757 (2009). See also Hiroshi 
Motomura, What is “Comprehensive Immigration Reform”? - Taking the Long View, 63 ARK. L. REV. 225 (2010); 
Kevin R. Johnson and Bernard Trujillo, Immigration Reform, National Security after September 11, and the Future 
of North American Integration, 28 IMMIGR. & NAT’LITY L. REV. 575 (2007); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Under Arrest: 
Immigrants' Rights and the Rule of Law, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 853 (2008).  
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in the Trump administration reveal how discretion can be used for broader purposes, and even 
misused. Against this backdrop, a close (re)examination discretion in immigration decisions is 
critical.  
 
Part II of this article explores examples of Darkside Discretion from the Department of 
Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and Department of State. Specifically, Part II examines 
the discretionary component in asylum, cancellation of removal, adjustment of status, waivers of 
inadmissibility, and waivers under the travel ban. This section is organized so that remedies with 
heftier statutory requirements are distinguished from those with medium or broader ones. Apart 
from the travel ban waiver, every remedy examined in this article includes both statutory criteria 
and a largely undefined discretionary component. Part III examines why the need for a standard 
for discretion matters, the human costs of retaining discretion, and cautionary notes for how 
creating a standard may negatively affect agencies and people. Part IV considers solutions for 
limiting the dilemma of Darkside Discretion and favors a proposal to eliminate discretion 
altogether.  
 
For this article, the author uses “Darkside Discretion,” “Delegated Discretion,” and 
“Discretionary decisions” interchangeably when discussing remedies processed by immigration 
officers at DHS, immigration judges at DOJ, or consulates at DOS. She uses the term “remedy” or 
“remedies” when discussing benefits, waivers or relief from removal. This article does not address 
uses of “prosecutorial discretion” except when identifying parallels or proposals relevant to 
Darkside Discretion. Also beyond the scope of this article is an analysis about the factors that drive 
officers or judges to determine if a person meets a statutory criterion, such as “bona fide marriage” 
or “extreme hardship” which “to the degree that it brings into play the adjudicator’s subjective 
notions, . . .has much in common with the application of discretion qua discretion.”10 
 
II. DARKSIDE DISCRETION DEFINED 
 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a cabinet level agency created by 
Congress in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.11 Congress delegated many of 
the immigration functions to DHS and split these functions into three main units: Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); and Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE).12 DHS has discretion to interpret many legal standards that have 
been left undefined by Congress. The Department of Justice (DOJ) houses the immigration court 
 
10 Maurice A. Roberts, The Exercise of Administrative Discretion Under the Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 147 (1975). 
 
11 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135.  
 
12 8 U.S.C. § 211 (2016), Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135.  
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system known as the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).13 Immigration judges in 
EOIR have jurisdiction to make many discretionary decisions when deciding whether a person 
qualifies for relief from removal. Similarly, the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) is the 
appellate administrative body within EOIR responsible for hearing challenges to immigration 
judge decisions made by DHS or the affected noncitizen. Finally, Department of State (DOS) 
consulates around the world apply discretion every day. Consulates are guided by the immigration 
laws and the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM)14 when deciding whether a visa should be issued and 
enjoy considerable discretion in deciding whether a noncitizen will be granted or refused a visa. 
The FAM does not have the force of a statute or regulation but is a daily guide for consulates and 
often defining as they are placed in the position of making discretionary decisions surrounding 
waivers. Relevant case law by the Board of Immigration Appeals is sometimes weaved into the 
FAM.    
 
The choice by Congress to include a discretionary component in various immigration 
benefits and forms of relief is worthy to acknowledge. Congress could have made these statutory 
remedies mandatory. Possibly, one purpose Congress had in creating a discretionary component 
for many of the statutory remedies in the immigration statute was to provide enough flexibility to 
federal agencies during those instances which are unforeseeable to Congress at the time, or in cases 
where adverse factors raised by applicants outweigh the statutory elements or positive factors 
overall. One can imagine a situation where an applicant for a waiver or benefit has a significant 
history that clearly warrants a denial in the eyes of the adjudicator. The broader question is whether 
the discretionary component serves the purpose Congress intended or as a normative matter. This 
author believes that if a remedy or benefit under the statute must include a discretionary 
component, such discretion should generally favor the noncitizen and that compassion should 
generally inform discretionary decisions. 
 
A. Hefty Statutory Requirements 
1. Asylum  
Asylum is available to people already in the United States who have suffered persecution 
or face similar harm in the future because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 
membership in a particular social group.15 Congress not only included a specific definition for 
 
13 EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, About the Office, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Aug. 14, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office. 
 
14 Foreign Affairs Manual and Handbook, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (accessed July 13, 2018), https://fam.state.gov. 
 
15 I.N.A. § 208; 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2016). While I analyze the discretionary component for asylum when a person is 
before an immigration judge, it is worth pointing out that people who are not in the jurisdiction of DOJ but who fear 
return will normally apply for asylum before DHS. 
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“refugee” that every asylum applicant should meet, but also expressed statutory limitations to 
asylum such as the requirement that a person apply within one year of their last arrival and not be 
convicted of a particularly serious crime.16 Nevertheless, asylum is a discretionary remedy so even 
if the asylum officer of immigration judge finds a person to qualify under the statute, they may 
still deny this life saving form of protection as a matter of discretion. The relevant statute reads: 
 
IN GENERAL Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives 
in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including 
an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in 
international or United States waters), irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply 
for asylum in accordance with this section or, where applicable, section 1225(b) of 
this title.17 
 
Whether an asylum seeker applies for protection with an asylum officer in DHS or an 
immigration judge in DOJ depends on their posture. A person may apply for asylum 
“affirmatively” with USCIS if they are in the United States in a valid status or without status but 
not in the jurisdiction of the immigration court.18 If an asylum officer in USCIS does not find the 
person qualifies, they are “referred” to the immigration court and will apply for asylum as a 
“defense” to removal.19 Asylum seekers may also file applications for asylum as a defense to 
removal with the immigration court for the first time following their placement in removal 
proceedings.20 
 
Historically, discretion in asylum has been undefined by a clear guideline, but nevertheless 
guided by precedential decisions by the Board. One of the first cases to analyze the discretionary 
component was Matter of Salim. In that case, the Board agreed with the applicant that he would 
face persecution in his native Afghanistan based on his refusal to “join the Soviet controlled 
Afghan army in its war against Afghan rebels presently fighting against the Soviet invasion.”21 
 
16 Id.  
 
17 Id.  
 
18 I.N.A. §208; 8 C.F.R. § 208; USCIS, Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION 
SERVS. (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-
states.   
 
19  I.N.A. § 208; 8 C.F.R. §1208; USCIS, Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION 
SERVS. (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-
states.   
 
20  I.N.A. §§ 208, 240; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208, 1240; USCIS, Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND 
IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-
asylum-united-states.   
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The Board gave significant weight to an advisory opinion by the Department of State that the 
applicant would face persecution.22 The Board then turned to the discretionary question, 
concluding the applicant’s use of a fraudulently purchased passport bearing someone else's name 
to reach the United States was a strong negative discretionary factor and warranted a denial.23 The 
Board made a distinction between a person being forced to use a fraudulent document as a means 
to escape harm, and the instant case, where the fraudulent document was obtained after the 
applicant escaped from Afghanistan and as characterized by the Board “with the sole purpose of 
reaching this country ahead of all the other refugees awaiting their turn abroad.”24 In the 1987 case 
known as Matter of Pula, the Board took a more generous approach when analyzing discretion:  
 
Instead of focusing only on the circumvention of orderly refugee procedures, the 
totality of the circumstances and actions of an alien in his flight from the country 
where he fears persecution should be examined in determining whether a favorable 
exercise of discretion is warranted. Among those factors which should be 
considered are whether the alien passed through any other countries or arrived in 
the United States directly from his country, whether orderly refugee procedures 
were in fact available to help him in any country he passed through, and whether 
he made any attempts to seek asylum before coming to the United States. In 
addition, the length of time the alien remained in a third country, and his living 
conditions, safety, and potential for long-term residency there are also relevant.25  
 
When discussing the scenario of a person using a fraudulent document to enter the United 
States, the Board held: “The use of fraudulent documents to escape the country of persecution 
itself is not a significant adverse factor while, at the other . . . the danger of persecution should 
 
21 Matter of Salim, Board of Immigration Appeals, Interim Decision 2922 (Sept. 29, 1982) 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2012/08/14/2922.pdf. 
 
22 Matter of Salim, Board of Immigration Appeals, Interim Decision 2922 (Sept. 29, 1982) 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2012/08/14/2922.pdf 
 
23 Matter of Salim, Board of Immigration Appeals, Interim Decision 2922 (Sept. 29, 1982) 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2012/08/14/2922.pdf. 
 
24 Matter of Salim, Board of Immigration Appeals, Interim Decision 2922, 316 (Sept. 29, 1982) 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2012/08/14/2922.pdf. 
 
25 Matter of Pula, Board of Immigration Appeals Interim Decision 3033 (Sept. 22, 1987). Matter of Pula has been 
discussed by scholars. See, e.g., Deborah Anker and Carolyn Patty Blum, New Trends in Asylum Jurisprudence: The 
Aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in INS. Cardoza-Fonseca, 1 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 67, 71 (1989); Kevin 
R. Johnson, A "Hard Look" at the Executive Branch's Asylum Decisions, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 279, 331–32 (1991); 
Kate Aschenbrenner, Discretionary (in)justice: The Exercise of Discretion in Claims for Asylum, 45 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 595, 612–15 (2012); David A. Martin, Making Asylum Policy: The 1994 Reforms, 70 WASH. L. REV. 725, 
726 (1995).  
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generally outweigh all but the most egregious of adverse factors.26 In discussing Matter of Salim, 
the Board in Matter of Pula concluded “we agree with the applicant that Matter of Salim, supra, 
places too much emphasis on the circumvention of orderly refugee procedures. This circumvention 
can be a serious adverse factor, but it should not be considered in such a way that the practical 
effect is to deny relief in virtually all cases.”27  
 
Matter of Pula remains an influential case in asylum adjudications and is oft-times the 
guide used by lawyers and officers alike when deciding if discretion is warranted in cases where 
asylum applicants meet the statutory criteria. One unique feature of discretion in asylum law is the 
fact that the danger of persecution should generally outweigh all but the most egregious of adverse 
factors. This passage has long been understood to protect asylum seekers who have suffered 
persecution or fear similar harm in the future in most cases.   
 
In the 1996 case of Matter of Kasinga, the Board applied discretion favorably towards a 
woman who entered the United States irregularly and faced persecution in the form of female 
genital mutilation:  
 
The final issue is whether the applicant merits a favorable exercise of discretion. 
The danger of persecution will outweigh all but the most egregious adverse factors. 
[citations omitted] The type of persecution feared by the applicant is very severe. 
To the extent that the Immigration Judge suggested that the applicant had a legal 
obligation to seek refuge in Ghana or Germany, the record does not support such a 
conclusion. The applicant offered credible reasons for not seeking refuge in either 
of those countries in her circumstances. The applicant purchased someone else’s 
passport and used it to come to the United States. However, upon arrival, she did 
not attempt to use the false passport to enter. She told the immigration inspector the 
truth. … [citations omitted] We have weighed the favorable and adverse factors and 
are satisfied that discretion should be exercised in favor of the applicant.28 
 
More recent case law reveals several reversals by the Board in discretionary denials made 
by immigration judges.29 In one case, the Board was critical of the immigration judge’s 
 
26 Id.  
 
27 Matter of Pula, Board of Immigration Appeals Interim Decision 3033, 473 (Sept. 22, 1987). 
 
28 Matter of Kasinga, Board of Immigration Appeals, Interim Decision 3278, 368 (June 13, 1996), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/07/25/3278.pdf. 
 
29 See, e.g., J-M-B-, AXXX XXX 197 (BIA Feb. 28, 2019) (reverses discretionary denial of asylum upon finding that 
respondent’s extensive family ties in United States were not outweighed by years old convictions and unlawfully 
bringing wife to United States while 8 months pregnant) (Wendtland, Greer, Cole); C-S-N-, AXXX XXX 231 (BIA 
Feb. 12, 2019) (reverses discretionary denial of asylum for applicant who fraudulently attempted to obtain visa prior 
to fleeing native country and failed to seek asylum in twelve countries prior to entering United States) (Adkins-Blanch, 
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discretionary denial for an asylum seeker stating,  
 
The Immigration Judge found that the respondent's decades in the United States, 
his United States citizen father, and his eight United States citizen children were 
outweighed by years-old convictions for forgery for writing a "bad check" and false 
statement to an officer, and for unlawfully bringing his 8-month pregnant wife to 
join him in the United States []. While the respondent's criminal history is certainly 
relevant, we disagree that it outweighs the positives and will reverse the 
determination.30  
 
In another case, the sole question on appeal was “whether the respondent's use of a false Angolan 
passport in her unsuccessful effort to obtain a non-immigrant visa to escape persecution supports 
the discretionary denial of the respondent's request for asylum.”31 Relying in part on Matter of 
Pula and Matter Kasinga, the Board concluded that discretion should be exercised in favor of the 
asylum applicant.32  
 
Federal courts have also reviewed appeals of discretionary denials made by immigration 
judges and Board members in asylum cases.33 The availability of federal court review over final 
asylum determinations by DOJ are unique to the extent that such review is unavailable for many 
other discretionary remedies in immigration law.34  
 
Kelly, Mann); S-A-N-, AXXX XXX 703 (BIA Feb. 1, 2019) (upholds discretionary grant of asylum to applicant with 
two convictions for possession of marijuana and two convictions for misdemeanor assault) (Grant); F-N-M-, AXXX 
XXX 389 (BIA Dec. 26, 2018) (IJ should not have denied asylum as a matter of discretion based solely on respondent’s 
prior use of false passport in failed attempt to obtain nonimmigrant visa) (Kendall Clark, Guendelsberger, Grant); M-
A-B-, AXXX XXX 333 (BIA June 30, 2017) (reverses discretionary denial of asylum based solely on respondent’s 
five-year stay in Israel prior to arriving in the United States) (Pauley, Wendtland, Cole (dissenting)); Jean Pierre 
Batcha Samba, A088 046 199 (BIA Dec. 19, 2013) (making false statements to asylum officer or in removal 
proceeding not valid basis to deny asylum in exercise of discretion) (Pauley, Donovan, Wendtland). 
 
30 J-M-B-, AXXX XXX 197 (BIA Feb. 28, 2019). 
 
31 F-N-M-, AXXX XXX 389 (BIA Dec. 26, 2018) 
 
32 F-N-M-, AXXX XXX 389 (BIA Dec. 26, 2018) 
 
33 See, e.g., Aden v. Ashcroft, 112 F. App'x 852, 854 (3d Cir. 2004); Aiqin Xue v. Holder, 538 F. App'x 35, 37 (2d  
Cir. 2013); Inyachkin v. Holder, 334 F. App'x 418, 419–20 (2d Cir. 2009); Kouljinski v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 534, 543 
(6th Cir. 2007); Li Peng Wang v. Holder, 346 F. App'x 615, 616 (2d Cir. 2009); For cases remanded or reversed, see 
Andriasian v. I.N.S., 180 F.3d 1033, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999); Castro-O'Ryan v. U.S. Dep't of Immigration & 
Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987); Huang v. I.N.S., 436 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2006); Kalubi v. 
Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1134, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 
34 See 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B); I.N.A. § 242(a)(2)(B). “Denials of discretionary relief Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, 
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Based on the author’s review of a handful of federal court decisions, three observations can 
be made. First, combing through a decision that was denied in the exercise of discretion can be 
difficult when a judge has denied relief on other grounds. In other words, discretion is not always 
the sole basis for denying relief altogether.35 Those cases are also less relevant to the solutions 
considered in this article, which presuppose that a person meets the statutory requirements, asylum 
or otherwise. Second, some of the discretionary denials tied to asylum are tied to the criminal 
history of the asylum seeker.36 Importantly, Congress has already set limits on who may qualify 
for asylum, and has created statutory bars for those who have been convicted of “particularly 
serious crimes” or committed “serious nonpolitical crimes” outside the United States.37 
Consequently, discretionary denials that are triggered by the criminal history of an asylum seeker 
who otherwise qualifies as a refugee is unjustified, and ignores the framework Congress designed 
with regard to criminal bars.38 Third, Congress has made amendments to the INA that expand the 
statutory bars for asylum to include factors what were once discretionary or irrelevant to the 
adjudication. For example, “firm resettlement” is a bar to asylum and refers to a person’s ability 
to live safely and permanently in a third country before arriving in the United States.39 Similarly, 
Congress injected a one-year filing deadline for asylum applications, requiring asylum applicants 
to file within one year of their last arrival into the United States.40 These changes illustrate that 
when Congress wishes to impose changes or restrictions to domestic asylum, it has and will do so.     
 
 
and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, and except as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether the 
judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review- 
(i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title, 
or 
(ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for 
which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title.” 
35 See, e.g., Kouljinski v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 534, 543 (6th Cir. 2007); Li Peng Wang v. Holder, 346 F. App'x 615, 616 
(2d Cir. 2009). 
 
36 See, e.g., Inyachkin v. Holder, 334 F. App'x 418, 419–20 (2d Cir. 2009); Kouljinski v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 534, 543 
(6th Cir. 2007). 
 
37 I.N.A. § 208 (b)(2)(A) (ii)–(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A) (ii)–(iii) (2016). “(ii) the alien, having been convicted by 
a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States;  
or 
(iii) there are serious reasons for believing that the alien has committed a serious non-political crime outside the United 
states prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States.” 
 
38 Beyond the scope of this article are the merits of each asylum bar crafted by Congress. 
 
39 I.N.A. § 208(b)(2)(A)(vi); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2016). “(vi) the alien was firmly resettled in another 
country prior to arriving in the United States.” 
 
40 I.N.A. § 208(a)(2)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2016). “(B) Time limit. — Subject to subparagraph (D), paragraph 
(1) shall not apply to an alien unless the alien demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the application has 
been filed within 1 year after the date of alien’s arrival in the United States.” 
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Scholars have also analyzed the discretionary component in asylum cases.41 In his work, 
The Proper Role of Discretion in Political Asylum Determinations, Arthur C. Helton analyzes 
some early cases involving discretion and limiting principles that can be derived from 
administrative law, statutes, the U.S. constitution, and international law. His analysis of Matter of 
Salim and its progeny is particularly rich, as are his cautionary notes about how discretion is 
applied. In his analysis, Helton found that asylum seekers were denied protection in the exercise 
of discretion based on refugees having found a “safe haven” in a third country before coming to 
the United States, criminal activities in the United States, terrorist activities abroad, and fraud in 
connection with manner of entry or attempted manner of entry.42 Ultimately, Helton was concerned 
about how discretion “threatens to swallow the right to apply for asylum in the United States” and 
how discretionary denials can leave genuine refugees in limbo.43 Helton discusses one regulatory 
reference in Matter of Salim:  
 
For example, 8 C.F.R. 208.8(f)(1) precludes the District Director from granting 
asylum relief to specific classes of applicants, and 8 C.F.R. 208.8(f)(2) states that 
the District Director shall consider- all relevant factors such as whether an 
outstanding offer of resettlement is available to the applicant in a third country and 
the public interest involved in the specific case. The regulations, in essence, 
summarize the specific preclusion in the Act against aliens who persecuted others 
abroad with this Board's and the judicially developed principles for the exercise of 
discretionary relief from deportation.44    
 
In her piece, Discretionary (In)Justice: The Exercise of Discretion in Claims for Asylum, 
Kate Aschenbrenner uses profiles drawn from actual cases to express the detrimental effects a 
discretionary denial can have on asylum seekers who otherwise meet the refugee definition.45 In 
 
41 See, e.g., Arthur C. Helton, The Proper Role of Discretion in Political Asylum Determinations, 22 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 999 (1985); David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. 
PENN. L. REV. 1247 (1990); Kate Aschenbrenner, Discretionary (In)Justice: The Exercise of Discretion in Claims for 
Asylum, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 595 (2012); David A. Martin, Making Asylum Policy: The 1994 Reforms, 70 WASH. 
L. REV. 725 (1995); Kevin R. Johnson, A "Hard Look" at the Executive Branch's Asylum Decisions, 1991 UTAH L. 
REV. 279, 331–32 (1991).  
 
42 Arthur C. Helton, The Proper Role of Discretion in Political Asylum Determinations, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 999, 
1004–8 (1985). 
 
43 Arthur C. Helton, The Proper Role of Discretion in Political Asylum Determinations, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 999, 
1019 (1985). 
 
44 Matter of Salim, Board of Immigration Appeals, Interim Decision 2922, 315 (Sept. 29, 1982). 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2012/08/14/2922.pdf; See Rosenberg v. Woo, 402 U.S. 49 
(1971). 
 
45 See generally, Kate Aschenbrenner, Discretionary (In)Justice: The Exercise of Discretion in Claims for Asylum, 45 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 595 (2012). 
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one case she profiles, an immigration judge concluded that a woman from Rwanda had established 
her credibility and burden of proving that she faces a well-founded fear of persecution in the future, 
but denied her asylum as a matter of discretion because they speculated that “she had not told the 
truth in obtaining the visa she used to come to the United States.”46 This applicant was ultimately 
successful in challenging her discretionary denial, but the entire process took more than two years 
to be resolved, causing both great human consequences of delay and costs to the government. 
Aschenbrenner discusses how Celine's appeal was ultimately successful, but how during the two-
plus year time period during which Celine awaited a final decision, she was separated from her 
family and financially challenged because she lacked work authorization. Soon after the appeal 
was granted, Celine passed away. Said Aschenbrenner, “Because of the delay caused by the 
immigration judge's discretionary denial of her claim to asylum, she was never able to bring her 
family to the United States.”47  
 
Aschenbrenner discusses the limitations that arise when a person is denied asylum and in 
the alternative, given a lesser form of relief known as “withholding of removal” to argue that 
discretion should be eliminated.48 Withholding of removal is a “cousin” to asylum but the 
differences are significant because of the standard a person must prove and the fact that qualifying 
individuals cannot petition to bring their family members who are currently outside the United 
States, or include them as “derivatives” on an application.49 Indeed, there are dramatic differences 
between asylum and withholding and removal, which, as shared in more detail below, support the 
solution by this author to eliminate discretion in asylum altogether. 
 
The politics of discretion in asylum cases have been central in the Trump administration 
and showcased in highly controversial policy published by the former Attorney General 
encouraging his employees to expand discretionary denials.50 In the decision Matter of A-B- the 
former Attorney General cautioned adjudicators about the importance of discretion: “. . . I remind 
all asylum adjudicators that a favorable exercise of discretion is a discrete requirement for the 
granting of asylum and should not be presumed or glossed over solely because an applicant 
otherwise meets the burden of proof for asylum eligibility under the INA.”51 Furthermore, 
controversial guidance from USCIS on how to implement discretion in asylum cases echoed the 
language from the footnote in Matter of A-B-, quoted portions of Matter of Pula, and inserted new 
language that may influence and increase the number of discretionary denials in the future:  
 
46 See id. at 600–1.  
 
47 See id. 
 
48 See id. at 625–28. 
 
49 See id. at 607–8. 
 
50 Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). 
 
51 Id.  
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. . . USCIS personnel may find an applicant’s illegal entry, including any intentional 
evasion of U.S. authorities, and including any conviction for illegal entry where the 
alien does not demonstrate good cause for the illegal entry, to weigh against a 
favorable exercise of discretion. In particular, ‘the circumvention of orderly refugee 
procedures’ factor may take into account whether the alien entered the United 
States without inspection and, if not, whether the applicant had other ways to 
lawfully enter this country. For example, the applicant might show that the illegal 
entry was necessary to escape imminent harm and that he or she was thereby 
prevented from presenting himself or herself at a designated United States POE. An 
officer should consider whether the applicant demonstrated ulterior motives for the 
illegal entry that are inconsistent with a valid asylum claim that the applicant 
wished to present to U.S. authorities.52  
 
The foregoing language is controversial because it attempts to normalize denials for asylum 
seekers who arrive at a place other than a port of entry. Practice advisories in the wake of Matter 
of A-B- were critical of the narrative around discretion which in asylum cases historically, is 
understood as favorable to the asylum seeker except in the most egregious circumstances.53 One 
advisory by the American Immigration Lawyers Association reminds practitioners that Matter 
Pula remains good law and that caselaw from the federal circuit courts of appeals may be helpful.54 
These documents advise immigration practitioners to explain any discretionary factors in a 
particular case and to be prepared to explain how and why a client entered the United States.   
 
2. Cancellation of Removal  
 
“Cancellation of Removal” is another remedy in the immigration statute available only to 
noncitizens in removal proceedings before the immigration judge. For example, a single 
undocumented mother who has lived in the United States for more than two decades and is caring 
 
52 Policy Memorandum, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs. (July 11, 2018) (on file with USCIS). 
 
53 See e.g., Practice Advisory: Applying for Asylum After Matter of A-B, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER (Jan. 
2019), https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/content-type/page/documents/2019-01/Matter%20of%20A-B-
%20Practice%20Advisory%20-%201.2019%20Update%20-%20Final.pdf; AILA, Practice Pointer: Matter of A-B- 
and Discretion, AM. IMMIGRATION LAW. ASSN. (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.aila.org/infonet/practice-pointer-matter-
of-a-b-and-discretion.   
 
54 The practice pointer provides an excerpt from one 2018 case from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, Hussam F. v. 
Sessions, where the asylum seeker entered the United States with a fraudulent passport: “Here, Petitioner certainly 
should have been more forthcoming with immigration officials. But under Pula, the Board's analysis may not begin 
and end with his failure to follow proper immigration procedures. See Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 504, 511 n.4 (4th Cir. 
2008) (citing Pula and noting that "the presence of immigration law violations" is a relevant factor, but "the BIA has 
cautioned against affording it too much weight.").” AILA, Practice Pointer: Matter of A-B- and Discretion, AM. 
IMMIGRATION LAW. ASSN. (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.aila.org/infonet/practice-pointer-matter-of-a-b-and-
discretion.   
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for children who were born in the United States, and a parent who is a green card holder, may seek 
“cancellation of removal.”55 Specifically, for nonpermanent residents seeking relief under 
cancellation, the statute provides that a noncitizen who is inadmissible or deportable from the 
United States may be granted relief if they have been physically present in the United States for at 
least ten years; can show good moral character during that time; can show they have not been 
convicted of specific offenses listed in immigration statute; and can establish that their removal 
would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to their U.S. citizen or lawful 
permanent resident spouse, parent, or child.”56 For green card holders facing removal, cancellation 
of removal can serve as a remedy if they can show five years in lawful permanent resident (LPR) 
status, continuous presence for seven years, and have not been convicted of an “aggravated 
felony.”57  
   
Discretionary denials of cancellation of removal can have lasting effects on the immigrant’s 
family and community. These effects are illustrated by the kinds of equities a person must or may 
show to qualify for cancellation. For example, if non-resident cancellation requires a significant 
level of hardship to a family member(s) then deporting the immigrant and separating them from a 
family can have a devastating impact on those left behind. For many applicants seeking 
cancellation of removal, a discretionary denial can mean a lifetime separation from family 
members who in turn suffer emotionally, financially, or medically. This author once represented 
an adult daughter whose elderly mother, a green card holder, was widowed and suffered from a 
life-threatening disease. As the only daughter in a Muslim family and her primary caregiver, she 
argued that if she was deported, her mother would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship.” The immigration judge found that the statutory requirements for cancellation of removal 
had been met, and that she qualified in the exercise of discretion. Had the immigration judge denied 
this case in the exercise of discretion, the mother and daughter would have been permanently 
separated, and the mother would have lost her only family caregiver.  
 
Cancellation of removal is a robust statute with strict requirements for qualification as well 
as a discretionary component. It seems redundant at best and potentially abusive at worst to inject 
a separate discretionary piece, given these statutory requirements that depending on the version, 
already requires continuous physical presence for ten years, “good moral character,” “exceptional 
and unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative and continuous or physical residence in the United 
States.58 Noncitizens who can show long time residence in the United States or strong humanitarian 
 
55 I.N.A. § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2016). 
 
56 I.N.A. § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2016). 
 
57 I.N.A. § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2016). 
 
58 I.N.A. § 240A; 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2016). Beyond the scope of this article but worthy of a note is the literature and 
critique surrounding cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents. See e.g., Molly Hazel Sutter, Mixed-Status 
Families and Broken Homes: The Clash between the U.S. Hardship Standard in Cancellation of Removal Proceedings 
and International Law, 15 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 783 (2006); Margaret H. Taylor, What Happened to 
SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, DARKSIDE DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES, 72 








factors to a relative should presumably qualify in the exercise of discretion, a term that remains 
undefined. Any eligible candidate for cancellation for removal has also lived in the United States 
for at least seven to ten years, which in the author’s view is independently a compelling positive 
factor.59 Given the rigorous requirements and statutory caps already in place for cancellation of 
removal, there is little purpose in preserving a discretionary feature to this remedy.   
 
Cancellation of removal is not the only remedy reviewed by immigration judges that 
include a discretionary element. Other examples of discretionary remedies that are brought before 
immigration court include waivers of inadmissibility, adjustment of status; asylum; and suspension 
of deportation to name a few, and reach at least one dozen.60 Individuals who go before the 
immigration court with an application for relief for removal have typically conceded removability 
and moved to the “relief” stage of their removal or court proceedings. At the same time, this should 
not be overstated, as most people who are removed or deported from the United States do not have 
a formal court proceeding before the immigration judge.61  
 
B. Medium Statutory Requirements  
 
1. Adjustment of Status  
 
In “adjustment of Status” or “adjustment” cases, DHS uses discretion when a person 
applies to “adjust” to a green card status while physically present in the United States. In 1952, 
Congress created section 245 so that immigrants physically present in the United States could 
 
Non-LPR Cancellation - Rationalizing Immigration Enforcement by Restoring Durable Relief from Removal, 30 J. OF 
L. & POLITICS 527 (2015); Kerry Abrams, Immigration Status and the Best Interests of the Child Standard, 14 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 87 (2006). 
 
59 Political scientist Elizabeth Cohen has examined the role of time as a tool for measuring citizenship. ELIZABETH 
COHEN, THE POLITICAL VALUE OF TIME: CITIZENSHIP, DURATION, AND DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE (2018). As described 
in this article, many formal immigration benefits and remedies also hinge on the length of residence of physical 
presence of a noncitizen in the United States; Finally, I have discussed in previous work the value of using time as a 
measure of exercising discretion. See e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action 
and Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H.L. REV. 1 (2012); See also HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN 
WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006).   
 
60 I.N.A. §212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2016); I.N.A. §245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2016); I.N.A. § 224, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (2016).  
 
61 See Bryan Baker, U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, Annual Report: 
Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2016, at 8 tbl.6 (2017),  
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Enforcement_Actions_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ3N-
ZTVW]; See also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE 
& L. 1 (2014); Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183 (2017); 
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-koh-wadhia-deportations-20180630-story.html. 
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“adjust” their status to that of a permanent resident as opposed to having to go abroad for a process 
known as “consular processing.”62 Section 245(a) of the Immigration Nationality Act provides:  
 
The status of an alien who was inspected and admitted or paroled into the United 
States . . . may [emphasis added] be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his 
discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes an application for 
such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant visa and is 
admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an immigrant visa 
is immediately available to him at the time his application is filed.”63 The standard 
for adjustment is stringent and requires that a person be inspected and admitted or 
paroled in the United States, be “admissible”, that a person be present in the United 
States, and that a person have an immigrant visa “available” at the time of 
application.64  
 
The statutory requirements alone bar a person who entered without inspection but is married to a 
U.S. citizen from qualifying for adjustment. Furthermore, those in family or employment 
relationship such as a spouse to a green card holder or an employee from India with an advanced 
degree sponsored by a U.S. employer may not meet the requirement that a visa is “immediately 
available” due to the backlogs.65   
 
Adjustment also includes a discretionary component, which means that a person can meet 
the statutory criteria outlined above but still be denied. Historically, adjudicators in INS relied on 
guidelines by known as the “Operation Instructions” and precedential decisions by the Board to 
decide whether a person was eligible for adjustment.66 The structure was largely decentralized. 
Immigration officers made the initial decisions and their superiors reviewed “discretionary denials 
 
62 See also Abraham D. Sofaer, The Change-of-Status Adjudication: A Case Study of the Informal Agency Process, 1 
J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 349, 351 (1972).  
 




65 See e.g., I.N.A § 201(d)(1)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (d)(1)(A); I.N.A. § 201(c)(1); 8 U.S.C. §1151(c)(1) (2016); Kyle 
A. Knapp, The Green Card Backlog – Take a Number and Wait . . . A Long Time, 16 No. 11 OHIO EMP. L. LETTER 4. 
 
66 See e.g., INS Operation Instructions § 245.5(d)(3) (“Every denial of a section 245 application solely as a matter of 
discretion, shall be reviewed by a district officer no lower that Assistant District Director, Travel Control before the 
decision is served.”), (4) (“If an adjudicator determines that a section 245 application should be granted in the exercise 
of discretion, despite the existence of an adverse supervisory officer before the applicant is notified of the decision. If 
a formal written decision is not prepared in such a case, the adjudicator shall note Form I-468 to show "Approval 
warranted despite (specify adverse factor or factors) for following reason: (specify)."). 
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and any discretionary approvals involving adverse factors.”67 If a noncitizen was denied 245 
adjustment, they were able to reapply for adjustment of statute before a Special Inquiry Officer68 
and if denied, appeal to the Board.69 While the Operations Instructions included a framework for 
adjudicators to follow when exercising discretion in adjustment cases, the standard was ambiguous 
and at best instructed officers to consider substantial equities and adverse factors as well as 
published precedential decisions.70 
 
Early cases by the Board show how both the absence of equities or a preconceived intent 
to remain in the United States permanently after entering on a temporary visa resulted in 
discretionary denials.71 In one case called In re Leger, the Board stated “there must be outstanding 
equities in a generally meritorious case, to warrant the grant of adjustment.”72 In another case In 
re Ortiz-Prieto a Chilean native who was in deportation proceedings because of a visa overstay 
and eligible for adjustment of status. The sole question in this case was whether discretion was 
properly exercised. The Board affirmed the discretionary denial from the special inquiry officer, 
noting that the Chilean native had no close family members or dependents in the United States, 
immediate family members living in Chile, and therefore no outstanding equities.73  
 
Eventually, the Board loosened the standard for discretion in adjustment cases, holding in 
the case of In re Arai: “Generally, favorable factors such as family ties, hardship, length of 
residence in the United States, etc., will be considered as countervailing factors meriting favorable 
exercise of administrative discretion. In the absence of adverse factors, adjustment will ordinarily 
 
67 Id.; See also Abraham D. Sofaer, The Change-of-Status Adjudication: A Case Study of the Informal Agency Process, 
1 J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 349, 355 (1972); ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, Procedures of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service in Respect to Change-of-Status Applications (Dec. 6, 1971),  
https://www.acus.gov/recommendation/procedures-immigration-and-naturalization-service-respect-change-status-
applications; Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the 
Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1297, 1305-06 (1986). 
 
68 Special Inquiry Officers (SIOs) functioned as “immigration judges” historically. In 1973, INS published a rule 
defining SIOs as immigration judges. EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, Rules and Regulations, U.S. 
DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Mar. 30, 1973),  
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/10/02/38%20Fed%20Reg%208590%2004041920.pdf.   
 
69 See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Change-of-Status Adjudication: A Case Study of the Informal Agency Process, 1 J. OF 
LEGAL STUDIES 349, 354 (1972).  
 
70 See INS Operation Instructions § 245.5(d). 
 
71 For a greater dissection into the role of “preconceived intent” as a factor in denying adjustment applications on a 
discretionary basis see Charles C. Foster, Logic of Adjustment of Status to Permanent Residency, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 37 
(1983). 
 
72 Roberts, supra note 10, at 161 (citing to In re Leger).   
 
73 Matter of Ortiz Prieto, Board of Immigration Appeals Interim Decision 1508 (Jul. 16, 1965). 
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be granted, still as a matter of discretion.”74   
 
Under the current framework, whether a noncitizen applies for adjustment as a benefit with 
DHS or as a “defense” to removal before an immigration judge in DOJ depends on their posture. 
A person who is not currently in removal proceedings would apply for adjustment “affirmatively” 
with USCIS. A person in removal proceedings would apply for adjustment as a “defense” to 
removal. This paragraph summarizes some cases involving the latter.75 Many of the decisions 
reviewed for this article involved cases where the Board reversed an immigration judge’s 
discretionary denial, and often included equities such as long time residence and strong family ties 
in the United States.76 In one case Jorge Adalberto Sanchez, the applicant was found by the 
 
74 Matter of Arai, Board of Immigration Appeals Interim Decision 2027 (March 4, 1970); see also Roberts, supra note 
10, at 162–3. 
 
75 The author thanks Ben Winograd from the Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center (Center) for collecting and 
making available unpublished decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals. The decisions summarized in the next  
session are drawn from cases provided by the Center. 
 
76 See, e.g., N-M-, AXXX XXX 196 (BIA Dec. 1, 2017) (reverses discretionary denial where IJ found equities 
outweighed by actions of respondent’s prior husband who was indicted for war crimes by International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)) (Pauley, Greer, Wendtland); Roderico Geronimo Tzum-Sum, A071 575 
904 (BIA Aug. 18, 2017) (reverses discretionary denial upon finding conviction for misdemeanor sexual battery under 
Cal. Penal Code 243.4(d)(l) not a “violent or dangerous” crime and respondent resided in U.S. for more than 25 years, 
was married to U.S. citizen, and had a U.S.-citizen child with cognitive disabilities) (Wendtland, Greer, Pauley); 
Teresa Moreno-Gonzalez, A200 946 740 (BIA June 29, 2017) (reverses discretionary denial of adjustment application 
upon finding respondent’s three U.S. citizen children, long marriage to naturalized U.S. citizen, and other positive 
equities outweigh five arrests that did not result in conviction) (Wendtland, Cole, O’Connor); Jorge Albeto Rodriguez 
Vazquez, A205 292 786 (BIA June 15, 2017) (reverses discretionary denial of adjustment application where 
respondent had close ties to five U.S. citizen children, was active in church, seemed genuinely rehabilitated, and last 
DUI was more than eight years prior) (Pauley, O’Connor, Wendtland); Zulfiqar Ali Mirza, A099 395 768 (BIA Feb. 
19, 2016) (reverses discretionary denial of adjustment application upon finding respondent’s positive equities 
outweighed alleged involvement in fraudulent petition for religious visa) (Pauley, Greer, Wendtland); Jose Alfredo 
Quijada, A092 041 082 (BIA Feb. 4, 2016) (reverses discretionary denial of adjustment application upon finding 
respondent’s positive equities were not outweighed by his unlawful entry and a 1989 criminal conviction for which 
he was placed on probation for two years) (Greer, O’Herron, Pauley (dissenting)); Mario Melgar, A200 550 222 (BIA 
Oct. 14, 2015) (finds respondent merits favorable exercise of discretion despite recent DUI conviction and lack of tax 
compliance) (Grant, Holmes, O’Leary); Ernest Antwi Asamoah, A087 310 643 (BIA Sept. 11, 2015) (failure to 
disclose DWI conviction on adjustment application was a factor to be considered in the exercise of discretion but did 
not render respondent ineligible to adjust status) (Mullane, Creppy, Malphrus); Gustavo Soto Enriquez, A087 274 650 
(BIA Aug. 5, 2015) (reverses discretionary denial of adjustment where IJ improperly relied on purported discrepancies 
between the respondent’s testimony and a pre-sentence investigation regarding an alleged offense for which the 
respondent was not prosecuted) (Pauley, Greer, Cole); David Aguinaga-Melendez, A200 759 135 (BIA May 19, 2015) 
(reverses discretionary denial of adjustment where no evidence existed that respondent was responsible for crime 
leading to prior arrest for attempted murder or that he benefitted from filing of tax return that inaccurately listed him 
as married) (Grant, Guendelsberger, Adkins-Blanch); Andrew Aburu Misumi, A094 075 414 (BIA Dec. 22, 2014) 
(reverses discretionary denial of adjustment because conviction for driving with open container of alcohol outweighed 
by marriage to U.S. citizen, present employment, and prior care for two U.S. citizen stepchildren) (Pauley, Cole, 
Donovan); Elena Hernandez-Hernandez, A074 571 777 (BIA Mar. 31, 2014) (IJ should have accepted partially 
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immigration judge to be eligible for adjustment under the statute but was denied in the exercise of 
discretion based on his criminal history. Sanchez challenged this decision because the immigration 
judge did not consider positive factors in his case. The Board agreed and remanded the case for 
additional factfinding.77 In the case of Manuel Velasquez Chavez, DHS challenged the immigration 
judge’s grant of adjustment under the statute and in the exercise of discretion. The Board upheld 
the grant, noting: 
 
The respondent78 has presented positive factors which generally weigh in favor of 
granting his application. He has resided in the United States for over 20 years (IJ at 
3; Exh. I). The respondent has been gainfully employed, and his employer stated 
the respondent is an excellent employee (IJ at 2). His employer indicated they wish 
to retain the respondent as part of their business (IJ at 2). The respondent earns a 
good salary (IJ at 2). More than 7 years have passed since the respondent's last 
offense.79  
 
The Chavez case serves as a reminder that even where an immigration judge grants adjustment in 
the exercise of discretion, DHS has the authority to appeal.  
 
In the case of Jesus Ramirez-Ortega, the respondent argued that the immigration judge 
failed to consider his equities when denying adjustment in the exercise of discretion. The Board 
agreed, noting his equities:  
 
 
complete evidence regarding the respondent’s efforts to pay delinquent taxes and failed to analyze her positive and 
negative equities) (Grant, Guendelsberger, Hoffman); R-P-, AXXX XXX 024 (BIA Feb. 19, 2014) (respondent merits 
favorable exercise of discretion in light of lengthy residency, immediate relatives who are U.S. citizens/LPRs, 
acknowledgment of criminal history, past victim of domestic violence, and lack of support network in home country) 
(Pauley); Joao Coutinho, A098 236 413 (BIA Feb. 11, 2014) (remands record where IJ declined to favorably exercise 
discretion because respondent and his wife’s account of alleged physical altercation contradicted statements in police 
report but failed to make any findings of fact regarding whether the incident resulted in conviction or to consider 
respondent’s positive equities) (Creppy); Enrique Manuel Vasquez-Perez, A095 802 066 (BIA Nov. 14, 2013) 
(reverses discretionary denial of adjustment upon finding positive equities not outweighed by single conviction for 
driving under the influence) (Miller); Fernando Linares-Isidoro, A095 729 470 (BIA Nov. 30, 2012) (sustains DHS 
appeal, denies adjustment of status as matter of discretion in light of respondent’s criminal history) (Donovan, Greer, 
Pauley); Hicham Sadik, A096 680 844 (BIA June 8, 2012) (upholds prior denial of adjustment application due to 
respondent’s failure to register with NSEERS program and to submit evidence demonstrating payment of back taxes) 
(Kendall-Clark)). 
 
77 Jorge Adalberto Sanchez, A076 561 900 (BIA Mar. 25, 2019). 
 
78 In immigration cases, “respondent” refers to the noncitizen who is normally responding to charges by the 
government alleging a violation(s) of immigration law. This same person would be called an “applicant” if applying 
for a benefit or a waiver affirmatively with DHS or a “petitioner” if filing a petition for review in federal court 
challenging a final removal order.  
 
79 Manuel Velasquez Chavez, A094 903 327 (BIA Dec. 10, 2018). 
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The record reflects that the respondent does have significant equities, including that 
he has lived in the United States for 24 years. He has significant family ties in the 
United States, including his United States citizen wife, four United States citizen 
children, his lawful permanent resident parents, and two siblings, one who is a 
United States citizen and one who is a lawful permanent resident (IJ at 9). The 
respondent has a consistent employment history and strong connections to the 
community (IJ at 9). Moreover, the respondent's wife suffers from serious mental 
and physical health issues, which make it difficult for her to earn enough money to 
support her family without the respondent's help (IJ at 9; Respondent's Br. at 8-9). 
In addition, the respondent's son is in special education classes and has a history of 
behavioral problems (IJ at 9; Respondent's Br. at 9-10).80  
 
This author has also worked on or examined cases involving male spouses from 
predominantly Muslim countries who lived in the United States during the post 9/11 era, eventually 
married a U.S. citizen but were denied adjustment in the exercise of discretion because they did 
not comply with a Muslim registry program crafted by former Attorney General John Ashcroft 
and known as “NSEERS” or the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System. The NSEERS 
program affected thousands of people in the United States who complied with the program but 
were issued deportation papers based on an immigration status violation. Importantly, an unknown 
number of people who did not know about the registration requirements (which were published in 
the Federal Register, a document not always consulted by men of the age bracket to whom the 
program applied), or were too afraid to apply because of the negative consequences they witnessed 
or experienced as a result of executive branch policies in the wake of 9/11, discovered they had 
not registered years later during the course of the immigration journey, such an adjustment of status 
interview.81 The NSEERS program remained on the books through most of the Obama 
administration, but was eventually rescinded years later through a “final rule” days before the 
inauguration of President Trump.82 The impact of NSEERS on those applying for adjustment 
illustrates how historical policy or political changes can influence future discretionary decisions 
in ways this author finds problematic. If the principle is for discretionary decisions to generally 
favor the noncitizen, denials of adjustment as a result of a discredited program like NSEERS 
undermines this principle.  
 
The former Operations Instructions and case law are not dissimilar from more recent 
guidelines published by USCIS on how the discretionary component for adjustment of status 
 
80 Jesus Ramirez-Ortega, A070 827 672 (BIA May 21, 2018). 
 
81 See, e.g., NSEERS: The Consequences of America’s Efforts to Secure Its Borders, Penn State Law Center for 
Immigrants’ Rights Clinic for the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (2009); The NSEERS Effect: A 
Decade of Racial Profiling, Fear, and Secrecy, Penn State Law Center for Immigrants’ Rights Clinic and the Rights 
Working Group (2012). 
 
82 Understanding the Final Rule Ending NSEERS, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Dec. 23, 2016), 
https://yalejreg.com/nc/understanding-the-final-rule-ending-nseers-by-shoba-sivaprasad-wadhia/. 
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should be considered. The current guidance cites to many of the cases identified above, and states 
in part “Absent compelling negative factors, an officer should exercise favorable discretion and 
approve the application. If the officer finds negative factors, the officer must weigh all of the 
positive and negative factors. The list of issues and factors may include, but is not limited to: 
 
• Eligibility; 
• Immigration status and history; 
• Family unity; 
• Length of residence in the United States; 
• Business and employment; and 
• Community standing and moral character.”83 
 
The USCIS guidance also cautions officers to “[a]void[] the use of numbers, points, or any other 
analytical tool that suggest quantifying the exercise of favorable or unfavorable discretion.”84  
 
Despite the existing case law from the Board and guidelines by USCIS regarding the 
exercise of discretion in adjustment cases, they are broad enough to result in discretionary denials 
by the stroke of a pen if an adjudicator decides the positive factors are outweighed by negative 
ones. In a meaningful number of cases, it is a single negative factor or mark that results in a denial 
in the exercise of discretion.85  
 
Survivors of Crime  
 
While section 245(a) of the immigration statute is the primary way a person applies for 
adjustment of status, some classes apply for adjustment under different statutory provisions. For 
instance, a survivor of crime who has been granted U nonimmigrant status in the United States is 
eligible for adjustment of status under 245(m) which in turn requires the victim to show that they 
are in a U-1 nonimmigrant statute, physically present in the United States for a continuous period 
of at least three years, did not “unreasonably refused to provide assistance in the investigation or 
prosecution of the qualifying criminal activity,” not inadmissible under INA section 212(a)(3)(E); 
that presence is justified on “humanitarian grounds, to ensure family unity, or is in the public 
interest;” and that they qualify for adjustment as a matter of discretion.86 U adjustment cases are 
 
83 Policy Manual, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (June 6, 2019). 
 
84 Id.  
 
85 See, e.g., Britkovyy v. Nielsen, No. 18-CV-718, 2019 WL 1473094, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 3, 2019); Yu Mei Chen 
v. Nielsen, 363 F. Supp. 3d 333, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2019); Siddiqui v. Cissna, 356 F. Supp. 3d 772, 776 (S.D. Ind. 2018). 
 
86 I.N.A.§ 245(m); See also U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Green Card for a Victim of a Crime (U 
Nonimmigrants), U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS. (May 23, 2018), https://www.uscis.gov/green-
card/other-ways-get-green-card/green-card-a-victim-a-crime-u-nonimmigrant. 
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unique because the applicant’s immigration status is tied to their helpfulness to law enforcement 
and experience as a survivor of crime or family member of such survivor.87 As a normative matter, 
one might argue that all survivors of crime who are helpful in the investigation or prosecution of 
the crime should qualify for adjustment in the exercise of discretion. Having worked with survivors 
of crime who qualify for U nonimmigrant status, the author has seen first-hand the courage it takes 
for a survivor to come forward and report a crime to the police or cooperate in the investigation of 
a crime. The equities or circumstances in these cases often include the presence of family in the 
United States, employment, and trauma.  
 
The regulations that govern U adjustment detail factors that should be considered when 
exercising discretion, and state in part “Depending on the nature of the adverse factors, the 
applicant may be required to clearly demonstrate that the denial of adjustment of status would 
result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Moreover, depending on the gravity of the 
adverse factors, such a showing might still be insufficient.”88 Practically speaking, USCIS has 
exercised its discretion to deny adjustment application for U nonimmigrants. One attorney shared 
with the author a denial she received on a U adjustment case involving a man with ten years 
residence and close family relationships in the United States, participation in a youth delinquency 
program, steady employment, and a 2015 arrest for sexual battery, sexual assault. The juvenile 
probation program was a special diversion program created for low level offenses. Despite the fact 
that the noncitizen was fourteen years old at the time of the incident and no charges were filed, 
USCIS found the noncitizen was a risk to public safety and failed to satisfy his burden of proving 
eligibility for adjustment of status in the exercise of discretion.89  
 
If an attorney or noncitizen is denied adjustment, they may file a motion or appeal to 
USCIS.90 In one case reviewed known as Matter of R-M-G, the applicant was a native and citizen 
 
87 Id.  
 
88 The full regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 245.23(d)(11) states, “Evidence relating to discretion. An applicant has the burden 
of showing that discretion should be exercised in his or her favor. Although U adjustment applicants are not required 
to establish that they are admissible, USCIS may consider all factors, including acts that would otherwise render the 
applicant inadmissible, in making its discretionary decision on the application. Where adverse factors are present, an 
applicant may offset these by submitting supporting documentation establishing mitigating equities that the applicant 
wants USCIS to consider when determining whether or not a favorable exercise of discretion is appropriate. Depending 
on the nature of the adverse factors, the applicant may be required to clearly demonstrate that the denial of adjustment 
of status would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Moreover, depending on the gravity of the 
adverse factors, such a showing might still be insufficient. For example, USCIS will generally not exercise its 
discretion favorably in cases where the applicant has committed or been convicted of a serious violent crime, a crime 
involving sexual abuse committed upon a child, or multiple drug-related crimes, or where there are security- or 
terrorism-related concerns.” 
 
89 Email from Attorney A to author (May 30, 2019, 7:04 PM). 
 
90 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2016), Jill E. Family, The Executive Power of Process in Immigration Law, 91 CHI.- 
KENT L. REV. 59, 73 (2016).  
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of Mexico who entered the United States at the age of twenty-two and was a “victim of a felonious 
assault, whereby he was threatened at gunpoint and his friend was shot in the abdomen and arm.”91 
He received U nonimmigrant status based on his helpfulness with the investigation of the crime. 
He was denied adjustment by USCIS. The AAO summarized the equities in the case as told by the 
lower agency decision:  
 
The Director acknowledged the positive and mitigating equities present in the 
Applicant's case: his lengthy residence and employment in the United States; his 
LPR spouse, U.S. citizen son, and step-son with work authorization; the financial 
and emotional support he provided for his mother in Mexico prior to her death; and 
the numerous letters of support from the Applicant's friends, coworkers, religious 
leaders, and acquaintances that described him as a hard-working, responsible, 
honest, and kind human being. However, the Director highlighted the Applicant's 
1999 conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) and his 1996 arrest 
on charges of aggravated assault and possession of a weapon during the 
commission of a crime. The Applicant’s criminal history occurred twenty years ago 
and pre-dated his grant of a U nonimmigrant status. The AAO remanded the case 
back to the Director after concluding that they failed to consider all of the mitigating 
factors in the case.92  
 
The outcome in Matter of R-M-G- favored the applicant, but it raises broader questions and 
concerns about the ability for agencies to focus on some factors and ignore others when deciding 
if adjustment should be granted in the exercise of discretion. Little purpose is served when agencies 
issue discretionary denials in cases that have already overcome several statutory requirements or 
where several equities are present.  
 
How discretion is exercised in adjustment cases is not just normatively important to the 
discussion but also practically relevant. A significant number of noncitizens apply for adjustment 
through family, employment, or humanitarian grounds annually. To provide a snapshot, in the third 
quarter of Fiscal Year 2019, USCIS received 137,299 adjustment applications, approved 153,071 
of pending applications, and denied 20,220 applications.93 The public data does not detail whether 
an application was denied in the exercise of discretion or because of failure to meet a statutory 
 
91 Matter of R-M-G-, Administrative Appeals Office Decision, (May 21, 2019). 
 
92 Id.  
 
93 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Number of I-485 Applications to Register Permanent Residence or 
Adjust Status by Category of Admission, Case Status, and USCIS Field Office or Service Center Location, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS. (Apr.1 – June 30, 2019), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20
Data/Adjustment%20of%20Status/I485_performancedata_fy2019_qtr3.pdf.  
The number of applications “received” include new applications and entered into the system during the quarter. 
“Denied” applications include applications that were denied, terminated, or withdrawn during the quarter.  
SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, DARKSIDE DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES, 72 








criterion. The author’s experience in seeking data on prosecutorial discretion in immigration cases 
is that filing a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request is necessary to yield such information 
and even then, the data itself is often incomplete.94  
 
2. Extreme Hardship Waivers 
 
“Extreme Hardship” waivers represent another area where the government uses discretion. 
Like with adjustment, a person will seek a waiver before DHS or DOJ depending on their 
procedural posture. For certain noncitizens seeking admission as an immigrant but otherwise 
ineligible because of an immigration violation, agencies have discretion to grant a “waiver” if they 
can meet certain requirements. One criterion an applicant must show is that a relative who is a 
U.S. citizen or green card holder will suffer “extreme hardship” if the applicant were to be 
removed.95 The immigration statute contains three kinds of waivers that include “extreme 
hardship” as an element: 1) 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility for certain criminal grounds,96 212(i) 
waiver of inadmissibility for certain misrepresentations or fraud,97 and 3) 212(a)(9) waiver of 
inadmissibility for unlawful presence.98 For each of these waivers, applicants have the burden to 
prove eligibility for relief and if successful will receive a permanent status or “green card.”99  
 
Importantly, every immigrant seeking a waiver under one of these categories must have a 
basis for receiving permanent status in the first place. For example, the author once represented a 
man married to a U.S. citizen wife and with a U.S. citizen child. He qualified for permanent status 
based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen but also sought a 212(h) waiver because his criminal history 
triggered a ground of inadmissibility. In preparing his case, the author had to show that her client 
met the requirements for a 212(h):  
 
94 SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN 
IMMIGRATION CASES ch. 7 (2017); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and 
Transparency in Immigration Law, 10 U.N.H.L. REV. 1, 4 (2012); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, My Great FOIA 
Adventure and Discoveries of Deferred Action Cases at ICE, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 345 (2013).   
 
95 I.N.A. §§ 212(h), 212(i), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(h), 1182(i) (2016). 
 
96 I.N.A. § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2016). 
 
97 I.N.A. §212(i), 8 U.S.C. §1182(i) (2016).  
 
98 I.N.A. § 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(9) (2016).  
 
99 Some scholars and practitioners have discussed waivers of inadmissibility in other contexts. See, e.g., Daniel 
Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. 
REV. 703 (1997); Katherine Brady, Update: The LPR Bars to § 212(h) – To Whom Do They Apply?, IMMIGRANT 
LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER (2014); 
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/212h_matter_of_rodriguez_update_2014.pdf; Julianne Lee, 
Tortured Language: Lawful Permanent Residents and the 212(h) Waiver, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1201 (2015); Jennifer 
M. Chacón, Loving Across Borders: Immigration Law and the Limits of Loving, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 345, 353–54 
(2007). 
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The Attorney General may [emphasis added], in his discretion, waive the 
application of [certain criminal grounds of inadmissibility] …in the case of an 
immigrant who is the spouse, parent, son, or daughter of a citizen of the United 
States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if it is established to 
the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the alien's denial of admission would 
result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, 
parent, son, or daughter of such alien.”100 The term “extreme hardship” is not 
defined in the statute or federal court decisions. Rather, the definition has been 
historically guided by agency interpretations of this standard in individual cases.101  
 
In addition to meeting the “extreme hardship” standard and other statutory requirements, 
applicants must also show that a waiver is warranted as a matter of discretion. Said the Board in 
one case In re Jose Mendez-Moralez in 1996: 
 
We emphasize that establishing extreme hardship and eligibility for section 
212(h)(1)(B) relief does not create any entitlement to that relief. Extreme hardship 
is a requirement for eligibility, but once established it is but one favorable 
discretionary factor to be considered. We would note, however, that an application 
for discretionary relief, including a waiver under section 212(h), may be denied in 
the exercise of discretion without express rulings on the question of statutory 
eligibility.102  
 
The case involved a 42- year old native of Mexico who entered the United States on a green card 
but was later convicted of first-degree sexual assault in violation of Nevada law. He was married 
to a U.S. citizen and (re)applied for adjustment of status based on his marriage in conjunction with 
a 212(h) waiver of inadmissibility based on his criminal conviction. Drawing from an earlier but 
well known case called Matter of Marin the Board identified lengthy residence, hardship to the 
applicant and his family, service in the Armed Services, steady employment, business ties, and 
community service as among the favorable factors to consider when deciding whether discretion 
is warranted.103  
 
When applying these and other factors, the Board in Mendez-Moralez held that discretion 
was not warranted. The Board recognized the strong equities in the case including his role as a 
 
100 I.N.A. § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2016). 
 
101 See e.g., Hassan v. I.N.S., 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1991); Palmer v. I.N.S., 4 F.3d 482, 487 (7th Cir. 1993); 
Osuchukwu v. I.N.S., 744 F.2d 1136, 1142 (5th Cir. 1984).  
 
102 In re Jose Mendez-Morales, Board of Immigration Appeals Interim Decision 3272 (Apr. 12, 1996).  
 
103 Id. at 301. 
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financial provider, father to three U.S. citizen children, husband to a U.S. citizen wife and a 
consistent history of employment.104 The Board also noted the wife’s medical condition and 
previous suicide attempt at the time her husband was charged criminally.105 Nevertheless, given 
the serious nature of the factual events surround the criminal charge and conviction itself, as well 
as the absence of any “persuasive evidence of rehabilitation,” the Board dismissed the case and 
agreed with the lower immigration court that discretion was not warranted.106 
 
Then Board Member Lory Rosenberg issued a powerful dissent, critiquing the majority for 
elevating “rehabilitation” as a determinative factor in discretion and weighing it more heavily than 
the elements of “close family ties” and “extreme hardship.”107 She found the decision to be an 
“abuse of discretion” and also one that “does violence to the statutory language.”108  
 
Years later, well after the demise of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service 
and creation of DHS, USCIS published guidance of its officers on the application of the 
discretionary component in waivers. USCIS cites to Mendez-Moralez:  
 
A finding of extreme hardship permits but never compels a favorable exercise of 
discretion. If the officer finds the requisite extreme hardship, the officer must then 
determine whether USCIS should grant the waiver as a matter of discretion based 
on an assessment of the positive and negative factors relevant to the exercise of 
discretion. The family relationships to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent 
residents and a finding of extreme hardship to one or more of those family members 
are significant positive factors to consider.109  
 
The USCIS guidance also points out how a criminal ground of inadmissibility on which a waiver 
is based may itself be a negative factor that yields a discretionary denial.110 While the case law and 
USCIS guidance underscore how a finding of extreme hardship does not necessarily result in a 
favorable exercise of discretion, they do not articulate a clear guideline for how this discretion will 
be considered.  
 
 
104 Id. at 314. 
 
105 Id. at 303.  
 
106 Id. at 305.  
 
107 Id. at 307–15.  
 
108 Id.  
 
109 Policy Manual, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS. (June 6, 2019). 
 
110 Id.  
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Waivers of inadmissibility illustrate just one category of remedies that include a 
discretionary component that remain undefined. Despite the presence of a body of case law and 
guidance by USCIS, one is nevertheless left with a discretionary waiver that lacks a sufficiently 
clear definition to avoid or challenge abuses. Furthermore, and regarding criminal waivers of 
inadmissibility, the irony of exercising discretion negatively for a criminal charge that is itself the 
basis for the waiver is not lost upon the author.  
 
Like with asylum, cancellation of removal, and adjustment of status, the statutory requirements 
for waivers of inadmissibility are rigorous enough that noncitizens who meet these requirements 
should qualify. Similarly, the choice by Congress to include only a specified list of criminal 
grounds that can even be waived or list requirements like “extreme hardship” to an anchor relative, 
underscores their ability to express limits and rules in connection with waivers. Finally, the number 
of noncitizens seeking waivers is far from trivial. To illustrate, in the third quarter of 2019, 
considering all waivers (including waivers of inadmissibility under which some of the waivers 
covered this section encompasses) USCIS received 18,904 applications, approved 12,713 
applications, and denied 3,608.111 The public data does not break down waivers by category, nor 
does it explain how many were denied a waiver in the exercise of discretion. Nevertheless, the 
numbers show that many applications for waivers of inadmissibility involving a discretionary 
component are filed with USCIS each quarter and annually. 
 
C. Broad Waivers 
 
1. 212(d)(3) Waivers 
 
Consular officers in Department of State use discretion in assessing waiver eligibility like 
(but not the same) as the discretion exercised by DHS in the consideration of waivers. To illustrate, 
when a “nonimmigrant” or one seeking admission temporarily through a category, such as 
students, scholars, or tourists is also a candidate for “inadmissibility” under immigration laws, they 
must prove eligibility for a waiver or otherwise exempt from the proclamation altogether. One 
common waiver known as the “212(d)(3)” waiver is guided by case law and the FAM. In the BIA 
case of Matter of Hranka, the Board held:  
 
An application under section 212(d)(3) requires a weighing of at least three factors: 
(1) the risk of harm to society if the applicant is admitted; (2) the seriousness of the 
applicant's immigration law, or criminal law violation, if any; and (3) the nature of 
the applicant's reasons for wishing to enter the United States.112  
 
111 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Number of Service-wide Forms by Fiscal Year To- Date, Quarter, and 




112 Matter of Hranka, 16 I. & N. Dec. 491, 491 (BIA 1978).  
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The literature analyzing 212(d)(3) waivers is arguably more expansive than the case law.113 The 
FAM also lists the following factors consulates should consider in deciding whether a waiver is 
warranted: 1) recency and seriousness of activity or condition; 2) reasons for proposed travel to 
the United States; 3) positive or negative effect, if any, of proposed travel on U.S. public interests; 
4) whether a single, isolated incident or a pattern of misconduct; and evidence of reformation or 
rehabilitation.114  
 
The 212(d)(3) waiver is available to those with equities but unlike many other waivers, is 
not contingent on the applicant meeting a qualifying family relationship or some compelling or 
exceptional case. The lack of exceptionalism in the 212(d)(3) waiver case is in fact “exceptional” 
as compared to other waivers and remedies in the immigration statute but most relevant here is the 
fact that DOS officers have the discretion to recommend (or not to recommend) a waiver for 
nonimmigrants seeking a waiver in this category. The opportunity to qualify for a 212(d)(3) waiver 
is important to a student admitted to a U.S. university but inadmissible for reasons because of a 
previous immigration violation or nonviolent criminal history, or a scholar accepted as a Fulbright 
at a health institute but inadmissible for the same. The list of reasons a person can be labeled as 
“inadmissible” under the immigration statute is broad and makes remedies like the 212(d)(3) 
waiver ever important. Further, this waiver reflects a judgment by Congress that qualifying 
applicants should not necessarily have to prove a compelling case like a family relationship or 
serious medical condition. Like with the remedies discussed in the previous section with DHS, the 
discretionary component of the 212(d)(3) waiver has not been clearly defined. 
 
2. Travel Ban Waivers 
 
Consulates are also responsible for considering if nationals subject to the presidential 
proclamation or “travel ban” are eligible for a waiver. The travel ban has undergone many versions 
but the latest one was issued as a Presidential proclamation and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court 
on June 26, 2018 as lawful under the immigration statute and U.S. Constitution.115 The travel ban 
affects all immigrants (or those seeking admission to the United States on a permanent basis) from 
Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Yemen; some nonimmigrants (or visitors from these 
 
113 See e.g., Jared Hatch, Requiring a Nexus to National Security: Immigration, Terrorist Activities, and Statutory 
Reform, 2014 BYU L. REV. 697 (2014); Edward J. Lynch, Medical Exclusion and Admissions Policy: Statutes and 
Strictures, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1001 (1991).  
 
114 9 FAM 305.4. PROCESSING WAIVERS, 7 Immigration Law Service 2d PSD Foreign Affairs Manual 305.4.  
 
115 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 201 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2018). See also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Symposium: 
Reflections on the travel ban decision, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2018, 5:02 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-reflections-on-the-travel-ban-decision/; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, 
National Security, Immigration and the Muslim Bans, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1475 (2018); SHOBA SIVAPRASAD 
WADHIA, BANNED: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE TIME OF TRUMP ch. 3 (2019). 
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same countries); and certain “B” visitors from Venezuela.116 On January 31, 2020, the travel ban 
was expanded to include most immigrants from Nigeria, Eritrea, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan; and 
nationals from Tanzania and Sudan seeking admission as diversity lottery program.117 For those 
covered by the ban, the only way to gain admission to the United States is to prove eligibility for 
a waiver before a U.S. consulate. The criteria for the waiver includes a showing that denying entry 
would cause “undue hardship,” that entry is in the “national interest” of the United States and that 
the person poses no threat to national security.118 The waivers are discretionary, but there is good 
reason to believe that waivers are not being considered as described in the proclamation. Quarterly 
statistics from DOS show that only 5.1 percent of applicants subject to the proclamation received 
a waiver as of March 31, 2019.119 Whether the exceedingly low rate of waiver grants or 
predetermination of the outcome violates administrative law because of its arbitrariness or the U.S. 
Constitution based on racial animus, a violation of due process, or both is unknown and is currently 
the subject of litigation.120  
 
Beyond the legal challenges surrounding the waiver process of travel ban is the ordinary 
discretion held by consulates to decide whether a waiver is warranted. This kind of discretion 
resembles how waivers and discretion function in DHS and DOJ. There exists no specific 
definition or principle for the discretionary component, a challenge that is only compounded by 
the absence of a formal definition for the threshold criteria needed to qualify, such as hardship and 









116 Proclamation No. 9822, 83 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
 
117 Proclamation No. 9983, 85 Fed. Reg. 6699 (2020); Press Release, Am. Immigration Law. Assn., AILA  
Condemns Trump Administration’s Expansion of Discriminatory Travel Ban (Jan. 31, 2020) (on file with AILA); 
Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Trump Administration Adds Six Countries to the Travel Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/us/politics/trump-travel-ban.html.  
 
118 Proclamation No. 9822, 83 FR 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017); Proclamation No. 9983, 85 Fed. Reg. 6699 (2020). 
 





120 See, e.g., Emami v. Nielsen, 365 F. Supp. 3d 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2019). See also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, 
Immigration Litigation in the Time of Trump 53 UC DAVIS ONLINE (Nov. 2019), available at: 
https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/online/53-online-Wadhia.pdf . 
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III. WHY ELIMINATING OR CLARIFYING DISCRETION MATTERS 
 
A. Limits on Discretion by the Attorney General 
 
One benefit of eliminating delegated discretion altogether or building a clear standard is 
that it provides a built-in check in balances for the system. During his tenure as Attorney General, 
Jefferson Sessions used a tool in the immigration law known as “certification” to reclaim cases 
decided by the Board of Immigration Appeals and re-issue new decisions unilaterally, often 
shrinking relief or protection for the respondent and future cases.121 The nearly one dozen cases 
certified during the first two years of the Trump administration has been striking.122 To illustrate, 
and as introduced in section II of this article, the Board issued a formative decision for asylum 
cases in 2014 recognizing explicitly that domestic violence can be a basis for asylum.123 
Specifically, the Board held: “Depending on the facts and evidence in an individual case, “married 
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” can constitute a cognizable 
particular social group that forms the basis of a claim for asylum or withholding of removal.”124 
The case, Matter of A-R-C-G was not the first time the Board recognized gender or sexual violence 
as a social group in asylum cases, but it was nonetheless significant and a foundation for future 
asylum claims. Following the shift in administrations, the Attorney General certified Matter of A-
B- and issued a decision that undermines these asylum claims and overrules Matter of A-R-C-G.125 
Authored by the Attorney General, the case leads with “Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 338 




121 See 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(h)(1)(i). 
 
122 See, e.g., EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, Agency Decisions, Vol. 27, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Sept. 
25, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/volume-27; See also Dara Lind, Jeff Sessions is exerting unprecedented 
control over immigration courts — by ruling on cases himself, VOX (May 21, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-
and-politics/2018/5/14/17311314/immigration-jeff-sessions-court-judge-ruling; See also Jeffrey S. Chase, The AG's 
Certifying of BIA Decisions, JEFFREY CHASE BLOG (Mar. 29, 2018),  
https://www.jeffreyschase.com/blog/2018/3/29/the-ags-certifying-of-bia-decisions; Bijal Shah, The Attorney 
General's Disruptive Immigration Power, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 129 (2017).   
 





125 Matter of A-B, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1070866/download. 
 
126 Id. Matter of A-B- has been criticized by a number of advocates and scholars. See, e.g., Theresa A. Vogel, 
Critiquing Matter of A-B-: An Uncertain Future in Asylum Proceedings for Women Fleeing Intimate Partner Violence, 
52 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 343 (2019); Fatma E. Marouf, Executive Overreaching in Immigration Adjudication, 93 
TUL. L. REV. 707, 752 (2019).   
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On July 2, 2019, the Trump administration went one step further by publishing a “final 
rule” that expands the ability for the Attorney General to review cases issued by the Board and to 
designate decisions of their choosing as precedent.127 According to one attorney, this new 
regulation, which became effective in September 2019, allows the Attorney General to sidestep 
any process at all before making a final decision or change to immigration law.128 
 
While the solutions proposed in this article for discretion do not prevent the power held or 
soon to be held by the Attorney General, it does set limits. Decisions by the Attorney General 
issued through certification or designation may not violate statutes or regulations. Beyond the 
scope of this article but a worthy policy question for a future one is whether the certification rule 
in title 8 of the code of the regulations should be rescinded altogether, or whether the immigration 
courts themselves should be removed from the Department of Justice.129  
 
B. Reduction of Arbitrary Discretionary Decisions  
 
Eliminating discretion or establishing a clear standard can help reduce arbitrary and 
capricious discretionary decisions. For example, the arbitrariness of the discretionary component 
in adjustment cases was analyzed by Abraham D. Sofaer in his study, “Judicial Control of Informal 
Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement.”130 While the agency structure and main players 
were different from today’s design, Sofaer’s work remains relevant today. In his study, he found: 
  
Examiners applied different standards in exercising discretion on the merits; that 
the Service’s view of discretion has changed periodically; that extensive and 
political intervention on the merits strongly correlates with the presence of 
discretionary power that official Service policy on the meaning of discretion 
permits inconsistent results; and there are striking variations among INS districts in 
their rates of denial of section 245 cases that do not appear explainable in terms of 
the character of the districts involved.131  
 
127 Board of Immigration Appeals: Affirmance Without Opinion, Referral for Panel Review, and Publication of 
Decisions as Precedents, 84 Fed. Reg. 127 (July 2, 2019).  
 
128 Law360, Revived Rule Ups Barr's Power To Shape Immigration Law, Law360 (July 1, 2019, 10:21 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1174543/revived-rule-ups-barr-s-power-to-shape-immigration-law.  
 
129 See, e.g., Immigration Judges Seek Independence from Department of Justice, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 733 (2002); 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1678 (2010); Jaya Ramji-
Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 386–87 (2007).  
 
130 Abraham D. Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement, 72 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1293, 1300–4 (1972).   
 
131 Id. at 1301.  
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Professor Sofaer’s study also reveals the significant role of political intervention in 245 
cases, concluding “Examiner reversals of discretionary decisions on the same record were 
overwhelmingly due to political intervention.”132  
 
Reflecting on the dissent by Board member Lory Rosenberg in Mendez-Moralez, perhaps 
the Board would have benefited from a guideline on discretion and reduced the dissonance around 
the weight accorded to the negative and positive factors in his case. Roberts also stated, “In view 
of the broad range of discretionary authority thus confided to the Attorney General and his 
delegates, some standards are clearly needed to preclude arbitrary and capricious decision-making 
by the many delegates of the Attorney General exercising discretion.”133 
 
A second lens through which to discuss arbitrary decisionmaking is the extent to which 
adjudicators use the discretionary component in a statutory benefit or waiver to deny relief and 
foreclose the option for judicial or federal court review. Under the immigration statute, most 
discretionary decisions cannot be reviewed by a federal court.134 But what to call “discretion” 
versus statutory remains elusive. Says Daniel Kanstroom: “Discretion has been so deeply 
intertwined with statutory immigration law for more than fifty years that much of the whole 
enterprise could fairly be described as a fabric of discretion.”135 In examining the relevant statute 
at section 242(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration Nationality Act, one source states: “[A] court cannot 
review the denial of most types of relief from removal that are granted at the discretion of the 
immigration officer or immigration judge, including a waiver of inadmissibility, cancellation of 
removal, voluntary departure, and adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident.”136 The 
statute contains some exceptions to the bar on judicial review for discretionary decisions and 
specifically in cases involving “questions of law” or “constitutional claims” and in asylum cases.137  
 
In his empirical piece reviewing 276 immigration cases involving jurisdiction and 
discretion, Kanstroom found that the majority of cases (179 of 276) were dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction, with nearly half involving an interpretation of “extreme hardship.”138 Casting 
 
132 Id.  
 
133 Roberts, supra note 10, at 158.   
 
134 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (2016). See also Daniel Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: the REAL ID Act, Discretion, 
and the Rule of Immigration Law, 51 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 161 (2006); Nancy Morawetz, Back to the Future? Lessons 
Learned from Litigation Over the 1996 Restrictions on Judicial Review, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 113 (2006).  
 
135 Kanstroom, supra note 134. 
 
136 Margaret Mikyung Lee, An Overview of Judicial Review of Immigration Matters, CONG. RES. SERV. (Sept. 11, 
2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43226.pdf. 
 
137 Id. I.N.A. §§§ 208, 242(a)(2)(D), 101(a)(42); 8 U.S.C. §§§1252(a)(2)(D), 1101(a)(42), 1158. 
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“extreme hardship” as a discretionary decision is problematic to this author, who understands 
discretion more narrowly and treats the element of “extreme hardship” as a statutory requirement 
as opposed to an ultimately discretionary decision. Kanstroom’s work shows that in many cases 
involving discretionary determinations, such cases are dismissed. Immigration scholar Lenni 
Benson has explored the degree to which an attorney may recast a case as involving a constitutional 
or statutory issue in litigation. She remarks “Knowing there is no judicial review of the 
discretionary decision, an attorney may now recharacterize litigation to raise constitutional or 
statutory issues. Barring review of the act of discretion has frequently only shifted the litigation 
strategy not eliminated litigation.”139  
 
Possibly, the degree to which discretionary decisions are denied vary from one circuit court 
to the next and hinge on the level to which a challenge is characterized as “discretion” or based on 
an issue that is in fact reviewable. In the second circuit, judiciary review is precluded even when 
a decision is based on the statute so long as there is any kind of discretionary decision and even 
where there is no reasoned explanation for the discretionary denial.140 In the case of Ling Yang v. 
Mukasey, the second circuit found that because the immigration judge provided reasons for 
denying adjustment in the exercise of discretion independent of the grounds to determine statutory 
eligibility, and the Board affirmed this denial, the court lacked jurisdiction to review this 
discretionary decision.141 Such a broad approach is problematic because it could influence 
adjudicators to insert a discretionary reason into a decision they would have ordinarily retained as 
a statutory reason because of pressure from the agency to create an outcome that eliminates the 
opportunity for future review in a federal court. This scenario is not unlike the pressure placed by 
the Attorney General on immigration judges to complete a certain number of cases or follow a 
particular directive that disfavors the grant of relief.142 Beyond the scope of the article but worthy 
of discussion is the undue pressure placed on DHS and DOJ employees to craft a particular 
outcome in discretionary cases.143  
 
138 Kanstroom, supra note 134. The dismissed cases included extreme hardship, cancellation of removal, adjustment 
of status, and voluntary departure. 
 
139 Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative Process 
Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 37 (2006). 
 
140 See, e.g., Ling Yang v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2008); Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security., 699 Fed. 
Appx. 44 (2d Cir. 2017); Marrakchi v. Napolitano, 494 F. App'x 877 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 
141 Ling Yang v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2008).  
 
142 See, e.g., Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.  
595, 600 (2009). 
 
143 Several scholars have discussed solutions that include but are not limited to removing the immigration court out of 
the Department of Justice. See, e.g., Immigration Judges Seek Independence from Department of Justice, 16 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 733 (2002); Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1678 
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Courts continue to grapple with the scope of judicial review in immigration cases. Despite 
the strong statutory language detailing the scenarios where federal court review is unavailable, the 
scope has long been governed by a presumption in favor of judicial review over agency actions.144 
One statutory provision known as 1252(a)(2)(D) was codified in 2005 and preserves review for 
“constitutional claims” or “questions of law” for certain noncitizens with final orders of 
removal.145 The scope of this provision was the subject of oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme 
Court on December 9, 2019. In consolidated cases of Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr and Ovalles v. 
Barr., the Assistant Solicitor General representing the government argued that when Congress 
used the words “questions of law” in the immigration statute, judicial review was reserved only 
for “pure” questions of law, and not mixed questions of law and fact.146 The lawyer for the 
respondents argued that “…when Congress created Section 2(d), it must have meant for more than 
just whether or not the Board used the right statement of the standard. It must include whether or 
not that standards used.”147 Beyond the statutory question, the Court also raised the presumption 
in favor of federal court review. Justice Neil Gorsuch asked, “Isn’t the presumption pretty ancient 
really? I mean, it goes back to the common law that the king can’t act arbitrarily without some 
check, some review, some opportunity by citizens.”148 
 
The principle in favor of judicial review was recently showcased in the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals in a case involving a father and child from Guatemala seeking asylum in the United 
States, forced to wait in Mexico under a controversial asylum policy known as “Migrant Protection 
Protocols,” (MPP)  and detained for a prolonged period at the Berks County Residential Center in 
Leesport, PA.149 One section of the immigration statute examined by the court was 1252(b)(9), a 
provision that limits judicial review in immigration cases “arising from any action or proceeding 
 
(2010); Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 386–
87 (2007).  
 
144 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001)(“ To prevail on its claim that AEDPA and IIRIRA stripped federal courts of 
jurisdiction to decide a pure question of law, as in this case, petitioner Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) 
must overcome both the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action.”) 
 
145 INA 242(a)(2)(D) 
 
146 Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr and Ovalles v. Barr, No. 18-776, 18-1015 (argued 
Dec. 9, 2019).  
 
147 Id. at 63.  
 
148 Id. at 55. For a good overview of oral arguments in this case, see Kit Johnson, Argument preview: Justices to 
consider limits on appeals courts’ authority to review decisions of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 2, 2019, 10:33 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/12/argument-preview-
justices-to-consider-limits-on-appeals-courts-authority-to-review-decisions-of-the-board-of-immigration-appeals/ 
 
149 E.O.H.C. v. Secretary United States Department of Homeland Security (3d. Cir. 2020) 
https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/192927p.pdf 
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brought to remove an alien” to only those with a final order of removal.150 The appellants argued 
that 1252(b)(9) does not apply to them because their case is not “arising from any action or 
proceeding brough to remove” but rather is a challenge to the government’s authority to deport 
father and child to Mexico under MPP.151 Drawing from judicial outcomes by the Supreme Court 
in St. Cyr, Jennings, and Preap, the “now or never” principle, and the presumption in favor of 
judicial review, the Third Circuit allowed most of the claims brought by the appellants to proceed. 
In reading the statute, the Third Circuit held “We are simply applying the usual presumptions 
favoring judicial review in reading the law that Congress has passed. …now-or-never challenges 
like most of the ones here do not ‘aris[e] from’ that action or proceeding. Following Jennings and 
Preap, we will not read §1252(b)(9) so broadly as to bar all review of those claims.”152 
Adherence to Administrative Law Values  
 
A third benefit of eliminating discretion or creating a guideline is that it would promote 
positive administrative law values. Administrative law values have been analyzed by plenty of 
immigration scholars.153 In her scholarship on prosecutorial discretion in immigration cases, the 
author has drawn from administrative law literature and examined how accuracy, consistency, 
efficiency, and acceptability as values emerging from codifying deferred action as a regulation.154 
Eliminating discretion altogether, or crafting a clear standard for discretion in formal immigration 
adjudications would yield similar but not identical values. Without a well-defined benchmark for 
discretion, noncitizens and lawyers who represent them, accuracy, consistency among like cases, 
and transparency are compromised.  
 
In his study, The Change-Of-Status Adjudications: A Case Study of Informal Agency 
Process, Abraham D. Sofaer examined 245 applications – “summary, disposition, representation, 
and bias in the decision of applications- that seem most pertinent to an interest in the consequences 
of delegating broad discretionary power.”155 Sofaer found that discretionary denials made by 
 
150 Section 1252(b)(9) 
 





153 See, e.g., Emily S. Bremer, The Unwritten Administrative Constitution, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1215 (2014).  
 
154 Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Sharing Secrets: Examining Deferred Action and Transparency in Immigration Law, 
10 U.N.H. L. REV. 1, 51–65 (2012); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Beyond Deportation: Understanding Immigration 
Prosecutorial Discretion and United States v. Texas, 36 IMMIGR. & NAT'LITY L. REV. 94 (2015).  
 
155 See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Change-of-Status Adjudication: A Case Study of the Informal Agency Process, 1 J. 
OF LEGAL STUDIES 349, 356 (1972). 
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immigration adjudicators were regularly reversed by SIOs without any change in the facts.156  
 
A similar pattern emerged in the roughly twenty unpublished decisions reviewed by the 
author and discussed earlier in this article- a high rate of reversals by the Board in cases where the 
facts remain largely the same. Treating similarly relevant facts consistently is itself a value and 
something the author has also discussed when analyzing immigration prosecutorial discretion 
cases. The importance of consistency is magnified when applied to discretion because of the effect 
across agencies.  
 
The current system lacks efficiency. The statutory criteria crafted by Congress already 
reflect a policy judgment that in many cases are more stringent than the “ordinary” balancing test 
behind discretion. That DHS, DOJ, and DOS officers are required to make decisions about whether 
a person meets the statutory requirements and thereafter engage in an analysis about discretion is 
time consuming, superfluous at best, or inhumane at worst. By eliminating discretion or setting a 
clearer standard, fewer applicants may need to file an administrative appeal because the decisions 
is arbitrary, leading to greater efficiency in the agency. The solution is not to reduce the 
opportunities for an individual to file an appeal but rather to reduce the number of times an appeal 
is filed because a discretionary denial lacked a sound reason. To echo immigration scholar Lenni 
Benson “By accepting efficiency as a primary goal, I do not mean to imply that it is the only goal 
of the adjudication system. The ideal system would also guarantee fair and individualized 
procedures and that people are not illegally removed.”157  
 
C. Cautionary Notes 
 
One tradeoff with creating standard for discretion is the pushback by government and the 
potential for greater litigation. Expanded litigation may undermine or at least diminish the value 
of efficiency, one value that informs creating a rule in the first place. The fear of litigation is not 
merely a theory but was a reality when the Immigration and Naturalization Service proposed a rule 
on June 21, 1979, “[I]nsure that all applications and petitions submitted to this Service receive 
consideration under appropriate discretionary criteria and are adjudicated in a fair and uniform 
manner throughout the United States.”158 The proposed rule premised the need for a discretionary 
rule on the ability for noncitizens to receive “fair and equal treatment before the Service.”159 The 
proposed rules contained discretionary criteria for a number of waivers and benefits in the 
immigration context, some of which are detailed in the previous section. Regarding applications 
for adjustment under section 245 of the INA, the proposed rule included a paragraph about the 
exercise of discretion:  
 
156 See id. at 391. 
157 See Benson, supra note 139.  
 
158 Federal Register, Vo. 44 No. 121, June 21, 1979, Proposed Rules. 
 
159 Id.  
SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, DARKSIDE DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES, 72 









In making a decision on an application for adjustment of status, consideration shall 
be given to all the pertinent factors, favorable and unfavorable. … The following 
factors shall be considered among those which adversely affect the exercise of 
discretion: preconceived intent to remain permanently in the United States at the 
time of entry as a nonimmigrant; violations of immigration laws; lack of respect for 
laws of U.S.: adverse foreign relations impact; no viable family ties in United 
States; abandonment or desertion of spouse and/or dependent children in the United 
States or in a foreign country. The following factors shall be considered as among 
those which favorably affect the exercise of discretion: advanced or tender age: 
poor health; lawful permanent resident or U.S. citizen family members dependent 
on the alien for support; lengthy residence in the United States: need for services in 
the United States.160 
 
The proposed rules also included changes to the 212(d)(3) waiver of inadmissibility and the 
following specific language:  
 
Discretion under sections 212(d](3)(A) [.] shall be favorably exercised unless there 
are adverse factors which are not outweighed by favorable factors. The following 
factors shall be considered among those which adversely affect the application: the 
activity giving rise to the ground of excludability is recent; the alien has a prior 
history of immigration violations; the ground of excludability is serious. The 
following factors shall be considered among those which favorably affect the 
application: there is evidence of recent good conduct and rehabilitation; the ground 
of excludability is relatively minor or based on circumstances remote in time; the 
need to enter the United States is great.161  
 
The proposed regulations were robust and covered several immigration adjudications involving 
discretion, but they were ultimately cancelled by INS in 1981.162 The cancellation was striking in 
contrast to the length of the proposed regulations. INS reasoned, “The proposed rule is cancelled 
because it is impossible to foresee and enumerate all of the favorable or adverse factors which may 
be relevant and should be considered in the exercise of administrative discretion. Listing some 
factors, even with the caveat that such a list is not all inclusive, poses a danger that use of guidelines 
may become so rigid as to amount to an abuse of discretion.”163 INS highlighted one particular 
 
 
160 Fed. Reg. Rule 36191. 
 
161 46 Fed Reg. 9119. 
 
162 Id.   
 
163 Id.  
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commentator who stated “You must make every effort to not eliminate discretionary powers by 
converting discretionary powers into a body of law.”164 Thus, INS chose to cancel the rule “to 
avoid the possibility of hampering the free exercise of discretionary authority. . . .”165 
 
 In reacting to the choice by INS to cancel the rule, Colin Diver opined “At least the Service 
is consistent: its explanations are no more transparent than its rules.”166 Nevertheless, the lesson 
here is that proposing clear rules can sometimes result in pushback both during by commentators 
from the public and ultimately by the agency suggesting the rules in the first place. If the 
counterpoint to publishing rules or standards is to ensure the exercise of discretionary powers, 
what is the balance? Is there a balance? This author continues to believe that an undefined standard 
for discretion in formal decisions like those described in this article are more vulnerable to abuses 
of discretion. If the tradeoff is that agencies have less discretionary power in the presence of a clear 
standard, the author finds the tradeoff is worthwhile for the values discussed in this article. 
Professor Sofaer also shows how such rulemaking may increase efficiency by lessening the 
number of appeals made and reversed when initially denied, especially in the case of adjustment 
applications.167 Professor Diver also challenged the efficiency in avoiding rulemaking, noting 
“Greater clarity would, of course, entail additional ex ante rulemaking costs. But that investment 
would undoubtedly be repaid by the reduced explanatory burden on individual adjudicators.”168 
Finally, creating a clearer standard would increase the humanitarian and administrative law values 
that guide its solution. 
 
IV. FINDING SOLUTIONS 
 
One option is for Congress to eliminate discretion in cases where the statutory criteria are 
already rigorous and reflective of policy goals of Congress. There is a strong argument for 
removing discretion for remedies with hefty statutory requirements. In the case of cancellation of 
removal, Congress requires similar standards and specifically non-green card holder, an even 
higher showing of hardship to an anchor relative. In the case of asylum, Congress has created a 
definition that requires a person to show past harm or future harm that rises to the level of 
“persecution” and harm that is tied to specific reason like race or religion. Removing discretion 
for waivers with medium statutory requirements is also appropriate to consider. In the case of 
waivers, Congress has set strict requirements surrounding residence, family relationships, and 
“hardship.” Finally, for those waivers written most broadly, Congress intended for the 
nonimmigrant waiver under 212(d)(3) waiver to be broad; revealed by their choice and ability to 
 
164 Id.  
 
165 Id. at 95 (citing Sofaer, supra note 62, at 396–97, 421).  
 
166 Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 94 (1983). 
 
167 Id. at 95.  
 
168 Id.   
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impose more requirements for other waiver schemes in the statute. The intentions of Congress are 
more elusive regarding the waiver under the travel ban because the ban itself was a creature of the 
White House.  
 
In every example covered by this article, a statutory grant without discretion would still 
require adjudicators to refer to statutes, regulations, and case law to determine if a person qualifies. 
Some of these decisions would still be subjective or quasi-discretionary because of the inherent 
nature of certain choices such as whether an applicant’s relative would suffer the requisite 
“hardship” or whether an asylum applicant would face “persecution.” In other words, many of the 
statutory criteria remain undefined and inevitably require adjudicators to rely on case law and 
individual circumstances. Nevertheless, eliminating discretion would increase efficiency by 
removing the layer of discretion altogether. 
 
A second option is for Congress or the executive branch to craft a regulation that creates a 
rebuttable presumption of discretion in favor of the noncitizen. The regulation could be housed 
jointly by the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice and Department of State. 
The idea of housing a standard in more than one agency is not new.169 How to craft a rule is no 
less challenging than understanding the tradeoffs of developing one in the first place. In his work, 
Diver talks about the “tradeoffs” when considering different formulations of language and about 
the importance of having a guiding principle.170 
 
The executive branches may also explore a final solution of providing more clarity for 
discretion in waivers and remedies that include this component. This third option may work better 
for the broad waivers, namely, the 212(d)(3) and travel ban waivers, as they lack the same rigor or 
language in the statute. The third option comes with challenges, many of which were described by 
Diver.171 Another concern with creating a new standard for adjudicators to apply is that it could 
make the process less efficient by adding prescribed factors for they would have to weigh and 
apply in making every discretionary decision. Further, officers and judges who do not favor a new 
standard for political or personal reasons may shift their focus on interpreting other quasi-
discretionary factors like “exceptional and extremely hardship” more strictly though the precise 
culture and trigger for such decisions (or what one scholar refers to as bureaucratic buy in172) are 
beyond the scope of this article.  
 
 
169 See, e.g., Authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security; Delegations of Authority; Immigration Laws, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 10921 (Mar. 6, 2003).  
 
170 Diver, supra note 166, at 70–1.  
 
171 Diver, supra note 166, at 106–9. 
 
172 Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic Administration: Experimentation and Immigration Law, 65 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1225, 
1233–5.  
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This article reveals the important role of discretion in immigration law. It showcases 
several statutory remedies that involve a discretionary component and argues that if discretion is 
applied, it should generally favor the noncitizen. By contrast, discretionary denials by the agency 
cause a Darkside Discretion that undermines the humanitarian role of discretion and calls for 
greater exploration into the solutions. This article proposed three different possible solutions for 
solving the dilemma of Darkside Discretion and contributes to the literature on immigration law 
in a meaningful and forward-looking manner.  
